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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of financial leverage on investment decisions of 
Portuguese listed companies and the extent to which it can be explained by the existing 
capital structure and agency theories. Using panel data from 2010 to 2015, we find a negative 
relationship between investment and leverage, and that this negative relationship is stronger 
for firms with high growth opportunities than for those with low growth opportunities. Our 
results are robust to alternative empirical specifications and support the debt overhang 
hypothesis, but contradict the overinvestment hypothesis and previous findings that leverage 
has a disciplining role for firms with low growth opportunities. 
 
JEL classification: G31; G32 
Keywords: Financial leverage; Investment decision; Portugal; Corporate finance 
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Resumo 
 
Este estudo analisa o impacto da alavancagem financeira nas decisões de 
investimento das empresas cotadas portuguesas e em que medida este pode ser explicado 
pelas teorias de estrutura de capital e de agência existentes. Usando dados em painel para o 
período de 2010 a 2015, encontramos uma relação negativa entre investimento e 
alavancagem, e que esta relação negativa é mais forte para empresas com elevadas 
oportunidades de crescimento do para aquelas com baixas oportunidades de crescimento. Os 
nossos resultados são robustos a diferentes especificações e apoiam a hipótese de 
subinvestimento devido a "debt overhang", mas contradizem a hipótese de sobreinvestimento 
evidenciada em estudos anteriores segundo a qual a alavancagem exerce um "papel 
disciplinador" sobre empresas com baixas oportunidades de crescimento. 
 
Classificação JEL: G31; G32 
Palavras-chave: Alavancagem financeira; Decisão de investimento; Portugal; Finanças 
corporativas 
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis aims at contributing to the existing literature on the relationship between 
leverage and investment by focusing particularly on the impact of financial leverage on 
investment in 44 Portuguese companies listed on the Euronext Lisbon over the period 2010–
2015. 
A central issue in corporate finance is the impact that financial leverage has on firms’ 
investment decisions. In a context of increasing global competition, investment is vital for 
firms’ growth and long‐term survival, as well as for countries’ productivity and economic 
growth. Therefore, this research topic is of interest to scholars, managers and policy-makers. 
Financial leverage is the use of debt to finance a firm's assets and projects (Odit and 
Chittoo, 2008). As a source of investment financing, leverage has both positive and negative 
aspects. By borrowing money at a certain interest rate and with it acquiring assets with a 
higher expected rate of return, a firm may increase its return on equity, magnify its earnings, 
and thus increase its profitability. There are also often tax advantages associated with 
borrowing because interest payments are tax deductible. But leverage magnifies both 
earnings and losses. The existence of too much debt in the capital structure of firms may lead 
to financial distress, which increases their financial and bankruptcy risks, as evidenced by 
the recent global financial crisis. 
According to the capital structure irrelevance theory proposed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), in a world of perfect capital markets, no transaction costs, and no taxes, the 
use of leverage would be irrelevant to investment decisions. But many empirical studies have 
since shown that leverage does have a significant impact on investment (Lang et al., 1996; 
Aivazian et al., 2005a; Ahn et al., 2006; Odit and Chittoo, 2008; Jiming et al., 2010, among 
others), so we must take imperfect market conditions and agency problems into account. 
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In a world with market frictions and information asymmetries, interactions between 
management, shareholders and debtholders give rise to agency problems which may entail 
underinvestment or overinvestment incentives (Aivazian et al., 2005a). 
Myers (1977) first identified the underinvestment problem by noting that, due to 
agency conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, when a firm is highly leveraged (i.e., 
when it has significantly more debt than equity) it may forgo valuable investment 
opportunities if too much of the new benefits would have to be shared with debtholders. 
Myers argued that “debt overhang” could also lead to potential underinvestment by making 
it more difficult for a firm to raise funds to finance positive net present value (NPV) projects. 
Another agency problem is overinvestment, which occurs when managers of firms 
with free cash flow at their disposal invest in negative NPV projects. Leverage can play a 
“disciplinary role” and help prevent managers from investing in projects with negative NPV 
by committing firms to pay cash as interest and principal and thus limiting the free cash flow 
available to them, curbing overinvestment (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). 
Myers (1977), Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) have shown that leverage can have a 
negative effect on investment. Subsequently, Lang et al. (1996) suggested that investment is 
negatively related to leverage, but only for firms with low growth opportunities. 
Low-growth firms may not have sufficient resources to generate revenue in order to 
repay the debt along with interest, and thus be forced to pass up valuable investment 
opportunities. In contrast, high-growth firms may more readily avail themselves of 
investment opportunities by using leverage because they have enough cash flow to repay 
their debt, which mitigates the financial distress and bankruptcy risk arising from its use 
(Sajid et al., 2016). 
Aivazian et al. (2005a) extended the specification of Lang et al. (1996) to a panel 
setting and also found a negative relationship between investment and leverage, and that this 
relationship was significantly stronger for firms with low growth opportunities. To estimate 
the impact of leverage on investment, we follow a similar approach to the one used by Lang 
et al. (1996) and Aivazian et al. (2005a), and in the second part of our investigation we too 
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test for differences in the impact of leverage on investment for high versus low growth 
opportunity firms. 
The empirical literature using Portuguese data on this topic is scarce. Barbosa et al. 
(2007) and Farinha and Prego (2013) found that financial standing is relevant for investment, 
but did not use Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment opportunities. Serrasqueiro et al. 
(2007), in their study of investment determinants following the approach of Aivazian et al. 
(2005a) and using this measure, concluded that growth opportunities are irrelevant as an 
explanatory variable for the investment decisions of Portuguese listed companies. The 
present study expands the methodology and models of these authors, and attempts to confirm 
their findings for a more recent time period. 
In order to investigate the relationship between financial leverage and investment as 
described above, we selected a sample of 44 Portuguese non-financial companies (excluding 
football clubs and firms with missing market capitalization data) listed on the Euronext 
Lisbon over the period 2010–2015. To measure leverage, we used two alternative ratios: 
book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total assets, and book value of long-
term debt divided by total assets. The second ratio is used by Aivazian et al. (2005a) but not 
by Serrasqueiro et al. (2007). In line with the extant literature, we expect the variables 
leverage, Tobin’s Q, cash flow and sales to be related to firms’ investment. 
We estimate our regressions using three different methods: pooled OLS, random 
effects, and fixed effects. In the first equation, we follow the model used by Aivazian et al. 
(2005a); in the second, we expand their model by including two additional variables: return 
on assets (ROA), to control for the profitability of the firm (Aivazian et al., 2005b; Odit and 
Chittoo, 2008), and the natural logarithm of total assets (Haque, 2014), to measure and more 
explicitly control for the effect of firm size. Finally, in order to demarcate between firms with 
high growth opportunities and low growth opportunities, we follow Aivazian et al. (2005a) 
and Serrasqueiro et al. (2007) and add a dummy variable to the first equation to examine the 
role of growth opportunities in the relationship between leverage and investment. 
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Our results show that leverage has a negative impact on corporate investment in 
Portugal. This finding is consistent with prior research. However, contrary to Aivazian et al. 
(2005a), but in line with Serrasqueiro et al. (2007), we do not find evidence that the negative 
relationship between leverage and investment is significantly stronger for firms with low 
growth opportunities than for those with high growth opportunities. Our results differ from 
those of Serrasqueiro et al. (2007) in that unlike them we found the coefficient of the 
interaction variable in question (D×Leverage) to be significant across various specifications. 
This thesis contributes to the extant literature by providing new evidence on the 
relationship between leverage and investment decisions. The analysis of the impact of 
financial leverage of Portuguese firms on their investment decisions is particularly pertinent 
and useful at the present time, considering their high level of indebtedness (Barbosa et al., 
2007). Despite the relevance of this topic, there are very few articles based on Portuguese 
data in the empirical literature (Farinha and Prego, 2013). Most previous studies have been 
restricted to US firms, and their findings may not be valid for Portuguese firms. By 
considering Portuguese non-financial firms listed on the Euronext Lisbon over the more 
recent and post-financial crisis period 2010–2015, our research thus provides insights and a 
timely analysis on the Portuguese economy. In order to give a more in-depth view of the 
relationship between leverage and investment, we expand the model of Lang et al. (1996) 
and Aivazian et al. (2005a) by including profitability (Aivazian et al., 2005b; Odit and 
Chittoo, 2008) and firm size (Haque, 2014) as control variables. To address the potential 
problem of heteroskedasticity (ignored by Serrasqueiro et al., 2007, and by more recent 
studies such as those by Jiming et al., 2010, Haque, 2014, and Sajid et al., 2016) we use 
robust standard errors not just for the pooling regression (Aivazian et al., 2005a) but also for 
the fixed and random effects models, and introduce a heteroskedasticity-robust Hausman test 
of fixed versus random effects obtained by the STATA command "xtoverid" (Schaffer and 
Stillman, 2010). Our findings partly corroborate those of Serrasqueiro et al. (2007) and 
suggest that leverage may have a stronger negative impact on investment for Portuguese 
firms with high growth opportunities than for firms with low growth opportunities, which 
supports Myers’s (1977) underinvestment prediction that firms with high growth 
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opportunities may pass up positive NPV projects due to the debt overhang problem, but 
contradicts the agency theory argument that leverage has a disciplining role for firms with 
low growth opportunities. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review 
of the extant literature on the relationship between financial leverage and investment 
decisions, and our hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the variables and the sample 
selection process. The research methodology adopted in this thesis and univariate results are 
evidenced on Section 4. The empirical results are reported and discussed in Section 5. Section 
6 presents a summary of the results, concluding remarks and suggestions for further research. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
The impact of financial leverage on firm investment decisions is a central issue in 
corporate finance. Several authors have investigated the relationship between financial 
leverage and investment using different approaches, time periods and geographical contexts, 
reaching conflicting results. 
2.1 The leverage irrelevance theorem 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the capital structure irrelevance theory by 
arguing that, under perfect market conditions, the investment policy of a firm should be based 
only on factors that affect the profitability, cash flow and net worth of a firm. These include 
production technology, market interest rates and future demand of its products, but not 
financial leverage, because financial risk can be diversified away by marginal investors in 
perfect capital markets. Miller (1990) subsequently argued that we should not “waste our 
limited worrying capacity on second-order and largely self-correcting problems like financial 
leveraging.” But the theory of capital structure irrelevance only holds if the perfect market 
assumptions underlying their analysis, including symmetric information, no transaction 
costs, and no taxes, are satisfied. 
Many researchers have challenged this proposition. Myers (1977), Jensen (1986), 
Stulz (1990), Whited (1992) and Lang et al. (1996) suggested that financial leverage could 
be relevant to investment decisions given the presence of asymmetric information and 
imperfect market conditions in the corporate world, such as institutional restrictions and 
transactional costs. They argued that asymmetric information in particular gives rise to 
agency costs (conflicts of interest between management, shareholders and debtholders) that 
may result in underinvestment or overinvestment. 
2.2 Agency problems 
There is support for both the underinvestment and the overinvestment agency theories 
of financial leverage in the extant empirical literature (Aivazian et al., 2005a). 
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2.2.1 Underinvestment 
The underinvestment theory posits that the cost of external capital and the possibility 
of default induce levered firms to decrease investment. This implies a negative relationship 
between leverage and investment. 
According to Myers (1977), high leverage “overhang” reduces the incentives of high 
growth firms to invest in new positive net present value (NPV) projects because their profits 
would have to be shared with debt holders rather than with shareholders. This makes highly 
levered firms less likely to exploit valuable growth opportunities, leading to the 
underinvestment problem of debt financing, which may negatively affect the firm’s value. 
Higher leverage can also discourage investment by increasing the risk of default and 
consequently raising the cost of obtaining further external finance (Mills et al., 1994). 
The potential underinvestment incentives created by debt can be reduced if the firm 
takes corrective measures and lowers its leverage by recognizing growth opportunities 
sufficiently early on (Aivazian and Callen, 1980). 
2.2.2 Overinvestment 
The agency problem known as overinvestment arises from a conflict between 
managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990) because the former have a propensity 
to constantly expand the scale of the business even through investments in risky or negative 
NPV projects to the detriment of the latter, thereby reducing the value of the firm (Hillier et 
al. 2010). 
The overinvestment problem caused by the agency costs of free cash flow is expected 
to be more severe in low-Q firms which have fewer positive NPV investment opportunities 
(Jensen, 1986). 
Leverage can potentially prevent managers from investing free cash flows in projects 
with negative NPV and reduce overinvestment, as described in the next subsection. 
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2.2.2.1 The “disciplinary role” of leverage 
The ability of managers to undertake poor projects after having funded all positive 
NPV projects and waste resources by overinvesting can be restrained by debt financing, 
which performs a “disciplinary role” by forcing managers to serve their commitments by 
paying cash as interest and principal and thus preventing them from wasting cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986; Haque, 2014). Leverage is therefore considered to be a mechanism for 
overcoming the overinvestment problem. 
Like Jensen (1986), Grossman and Hart (1982), Stulz (1990), Novaes and Zingales 
(1995) and Hart and Moore (1995) have all argued that debt financing has a positive impact 
on the value of the firm by forcing managers to pay out excess funds to service debt and thus 
restraining unprofitable overinvestment. 
Overall, the extant empirical literature provides support to the theory that leverage 
has a disciplining role for firms with low growth opportunities, likely costing 
underinvestment, but restraining overinvestment. 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
2.3.1 Main hypotheses 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the impact of financial leverage on 
firms' investment decisions. From the theoretical and empirical results discussed in the 
previous sections, which establish the relevance of financial leverage for investment, we 
present our first hypothesis as follows: 
H1a: There is significant relationship between financial leverage and investment. 
Most previous empirical studies have identified a negative relationship between 
leverage and investment (Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 2005a; Ahn et al., 2006; Odit and 
Chittoo, 2008; Firth et al., 2008; Jiming et al., 2010; Dang, 2011; Haque, 2014; Sajid et al., 
2016), with few exceptions (Rajakumar, 2005; Riaz, 2012). 
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On the one hand, as we have seen, raising debt can refrain managers from 
overinvestment; on the other hand, as Stulz (1990) warns, increased financial leverage does 
not necessarily lead to a reduction in agency costs, and can in fact aggravate the 
underinvestment problem. Therefore, based on the literature, we predict a negative sign for 
the coefficient of leverage, i.e., we expect a strong negative relationship between leverage 
and firm investment: 
H1b: There is negative and significant relationship between financial leverage and 
investment. 
2.3.1.1 The role of growth opportunities 
The importance and influence of growth opportunities on the relationship between 
financial leverage and investment has been emphasized in several studies. Stulz (1990) 
argued that a firm’s debt level choice may depend on the type of growth options available to 
it. Firms with high growth opportunities (with Tobin’s Q greater than one) are expected to 
have higher cash flows, which mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard problems in 
capital markets (Aivazian et al. 2005a), relaxing financial constraints. High-growth firms 
may thus more readily avail themselves of investment opportunities by the use of leverage 
(Sajid et al., 2016), as a consequence of having easier access to capital markets and lower 
bankruptcy risk arising from the use of debt. Low-growth firms, in contrast, may not be able 
to generate enough revenue in order to repay the debt along with interest, and thus be forced 
to pass up valuable investment opportunities. This difference between high- and low-growth 
firms has been confirmed by empirical studies in various contexts. Lang et al. (1996) 
analyzed a large sample of US industrial firms over the period 1970–1989 and argued that 
leverage “does not reduce growth for firms known to have good investment opportunities”, 
but found a strong negative relationship between leverage and investment for industrial firms 
with fewer investment opportunities. Aivazian et al. (2005a), investigating the impact of 
leverage on investment for 1035 Canadian industrial companies from 1982 to 1999, found a 
negative relationship between leverage and investment, and that this negative relationship is 
stronger for firms with low growth opportunities. Odit and Chitto (2008) examined the 
impact of financial leverage on the investment decisions of 27 Mauritian firms for the period 
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1990–2004 and also found a significant negative relationship between leverage and 
investment for low investment opportunity firms. Based on these findings, we hypothesize 
the following: 
H1c: There is a negative and significant relationship between financial leverage and 
investment, and this negative relationship is significantly stronger for firms with low growth 
opportunities. 
In an empirical study of the determinants of investment of 38 Portuguese listed 
companies for the period 1998–2004, Serrasqueiro et al. (2007) reported a significant 
negative relationship between leverage and investment, but did not find a significant 
relationship between growth opportunities and investment, nor that the negative relationship 
between leverage and investment was significantly stronger for firms with low growth 
opportunities than for those with high growth opportunities. Their results contradicted the 
arguments put forward by Grossman and Hart (1982), Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) that 
leverage has a disciplining role for firms with low growth opportunities which prevents them 
from investing in negative NPV projects. Hypothesis H1c allows us to empirically test these 
arguments and to either confirm or refute previous findings, in the Portuguese context, for a 
more recent period. 
2.3.2 Secondary hypotheses 
In addition to our primary hypotheses, we also test five secondary hypotheses. 
Numerous empirical studies have identified a positive relationship between cash 
flows and corporate investment (McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Farinha, 1995; Lang et al., 
1996; Aivazian et al., 2005a; Serrasqueiro et al., 2007, among others), which may be 
evidence of financing constraints, and is consistent with the “free cash flow” hypothesis 
(Jensen, 1986) according to which managers tend to waste free cash flows by investing in 
negative NPV projects rather than distribute them to shareholders. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
proposed a different explanation of the cash flow–investment relationship based on 
information asymmetries between managers and outside investors, arguing that these create 
a “pecking order” hierarchy in companies' financial policy where managers prefer to finance 
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investments with internally generated funds to avoid the costs of external financing, which 
can lead them to forego positive NPV investments. The availability of internal funds may 
thus be an important determinant of investment. Firms with enough cash inflows can utilize 
them in investing activities (Odit and Chittoo, 2008), so we hypothesize that: 
H2: There is a positive and significant relationship between cash flow and investment. 
Tobin's Q is commonly used as a proxy for growth opportunities. It compares the 
market value of a firm with the replacement or book value of its assets. A Tobin's Q greater 
than one signifies that the market value of the firm is greater than the recorded value of its 
assets (Odit and Chittoo, 2008), indicating high growth opportunities. The greater a firm’s 
Tobin’s Q, the greater its growth opportunities. In accordance with most previous literature, 
we assume that firms increase their investment in response to higher growth opportunities, 
i.e., we expect the relationship between Tobin's Q and investment to be positive: 
H3: There is positive and significant relationship between Tobin’s Q and investment. 
Sales, or sales growth (Odit and Chittoo, 2008), play a significant role in explaining 
firm investment. Aivazian et al. (2005a) identified a positive and significant relationship 
between sales and investment. This significant relationship confirms the relevance of factors 
external to the firm as determinants of investment, and lends support to the neoclassical 
theory according to which investment decisions depend essentially on such external factors 
(Serrasqueiro et. al., 2007). As sales growth may provide an incentive for firms to increase 
their level of investment and so expand their market share (Serrasqueiro et. al., 2012), we 
predict that: 
H4: There is positive and significant relationship between sales and investment. 
Profitability has also been found to be a significant determinant of investment. 
Aivazian et al. (2005b) and Odit and Chittoo (2008) included return on assets (ROA) in their 
regressions, to control for firm profitability and performance, and reported a positive and 
significant coefficient, which implies that firms with higher profitability tend to have higher 
investment rates. Firms that are more profitable have access to greater retained earnings and 
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may use them to finance their investments, consistent with the pecking order theory. We 
therefore expect profitability to have a positive impact on investment: 
H5: There is a positive and significant relationship between profitability and investment. 
Firm size may also have an impact on investment. The results of the studies by 
Barbosa et al. (2007) and Farinha and Prego (2013) of Portuguese firms’ financial standing 
and investment decisions suggest a negative relationship between the size of the firm and its 
investment rate. However, larger firms are expected to have lower information asymmetries 
(Farinha and Prego, 2013; Haque, 2014), be more diversified (Antão and Bonfim, 2008), 
have lower bankruptcy risk, and consequently have easier access to external financing. They 
thus tend to be subject to fewer liquidity constraints than smaller firms (Farinha and Prego, 
2013), and can more easily raise debt to finance their investments (Haque, 2014). For these 
reasons, we predict a positive relationship between firm size and investment: 
H6: There is a positive and significant relationship between firm size and investment.  
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3. Variables Definition and Sample Selection 
  
3.1 Variables Definition 
In this study, we use seven variables to examine the relationship between leverage 
and investment. Cash flow, Tobin’s Q, sales, profitability and firm size are included as 
control variables. 
3.1.1 Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is net investment, measured as capital expenditures minus 
depreciation, deflated by lagged net fixed assets (Aivazian et al., 2005a; Odit and Chittoo, 
2008). 
3.1.2 Independent variables 
We use two measures of leverage: the ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the 
book value of total assets, and the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to total assets, in 
order to distinguish between short-term and long-term debt. The second ratio “emphasizes 
the dominant role of long-term debt as a determinant of investment” (Aivazian et al., 2005a). 
Cash flow is measured as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and 
depreciation (Aivazian et al., 2005a; Odit and Chittoo, 2008). 
Tobin’s Q controls for growth opportunities and is defined as the market value of 
assets divided by the book value of assets (Aivazian et al., 2005a). 
Sales is measured as the ratio of net sales to lagged net fixed assets (Aivazian et al., 
2005a).  
As a proxy for profitability, we use return on assets (ROA) measured as the ratio of 
net profits to average total assets, in the same year as the dependent variable (Aivazian et al., 
2005b), to control for firm performance. 
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To measure and control for the effect of firm size, we use the natural logarithm of 
total assets (Haque, 2014). A similar variable was used by Barbosa et al. (2007). 
Table 1 summarizes the variable definitions, data sources, and the expected signs of 
the regression coefficients. 
 
Table 1: Variables: measurement, source code, and expected signs of the explanatory variables 
Variables  Measurement DS Code Predicted Sign 
Investment (dependent)  (Capital expenditure 
– Depreciation) 
/ Lagged net fixed assets 
WC04601 
WC01148 
WC02999 
WC02201 
WC02649 
 
Leverage Total liabilities 
/ Total assets 
WC03351 
WC02999 
– 
Leverage 2  Long term debt 
/ Total assets  
WC03251 
WC02999 
– 
Cash flow Earnings before extraordinary items 
+ Depreciation  
WC01751 
WC01148 
+ 
Tobin’s Q (Market capitalization 
+ Market value of liabilities) 
/ Total assets 
WC08001 
WC03351 
WC02999 
+ 
Sales Net sales 
/ Lagged net fixed assets 
WC01001 
WC02999 
WC02201 
WC02649 
+ 
Profitability Net profit / Average total assets WC08326 + 
Size  Log (Total assets) WC02999 + 
This table presents the variable definitions and the predicted signs of the coefficients. Net fixed assets are 
calculated as Total assets − Total current assets − Total intangibles and goodwill (Sajid et al., 2016). 
Source code: DATASTREAM. 
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3.2 Sample Selection 
The data used in this study has been obtained from DATASTREAM, a financial 
database provided by Thomson Reuter, and complemented with data collected from SABI, a 
financial database provided by Bureau van Dijk, and companies’ annual reports. We start 
with an initial sample of 53 Portuguese non-financial companies listed on the Euronext 
Lisbon, as reported in the SABI database. We exclude four football club companies 
(following Serrasqueiro et al., 2007), and five companies with missing market capitalization 
data (needed to calculate Tobin's Q) for all years of the sample period. Our final dataset 
consists of an unbalanced panel of 211 firm-year observations of 441 Portuguese publicly 
traded companies for a period of six years from 2010 to 2015. 
 
  
                                                          
1 The final sample of Serrasqueiro et al. (2007), who used a similar procedure, was composed of 38 Portuguese 
listed companies. 
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4. Methodology and Univariate Analysis 
 
4.1 Methodology 
We use three regression equations to test the hypotheses developed in Section 2. The 
first is the reduced-form investment equation of Aivazian et al. (2005a), adapted from Lang 
et al. (1996), which is as follows: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(1) 
where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the net investment of firm i at time t; 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 is lagged net fixed assets; 𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the 
cash flow of firm i at time t; 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 is lagged Tobin’s Q; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is lagged leverage; 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 is lagged net sales; 𝛼 is the intercept; 𝜆𝑡 is a set of year dummies to control for 
time fixed effects; 𝜇𝑖 is the individual effect of firm i, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
In addition to this baseline specification, we attempt to give a more comprehensive 
view of the relationship between leverage and investment of Portuguese firms and improve 
the explanatory power of Aivazian et al. (2005a)’s model by adding two other possible 
determinants of investment as control variables: profitability (Aivazian et al., 2005b; Odit 
and Chittoo, 2008) and firm size (Haque, 2014). The introduction of these two variables 
allows us to test hypotheses H5 and H6. Our proposed model specification is: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(2) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the profitability of firm i at time t, and 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 is the size of firm i in the 
previous period. 
We estimate the regression equations using pooled OLS, but following Aivazian et 
al. (2005a) we also employ random and fixed effects models to assess the robustness of the 
results and control for individual firm heterogeneity. 
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To test for random effects and so determine whether the random effects model, which 
assumes that the unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the regressors, is 
more appropriate than pooled OLS, we use Breusch and Pagan’s (1980) Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test, the null hypothesis of which is that there are no random effects. To verify whether 
the random effects model is more efficient than the fixed effects model, which assumes that 
the unobservable individual effects are correlated with the regressors, we use Hausman’s 
(1978) specification test. The results allow us to reject the null hypothesis of both tests. In 
line with previous empirical studies, we conclude that the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate specification. 
We also consider the possibility of first-order autocorrelation in the error terms. 
Following Aivazian et al. (2005a), we estimate a fixed effects model with first-order 
autocorrelation, assuming 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = ρ𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑧𝑖,𝑡, where 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is independently and identically 
distributed, and in agreement with them we find that the estimated coefficients are similar to 
those of the fixed effects model without controlling for autocorrelation. 
To examine the role of growth opportunities in the relationship between financial 
leverage and investment, as described in Section 2.3.1.1, and for our results to be comparable 
to those of previous studies, particularly to that of Serrasqueiro et al. (2007) of Portuguese 
listed companies, we adopt the methodology of Aivazian et al. (2005a) and add an interaction 
term between leverage and a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms with high 
growth opportunities (Tobin′s Q > 1), and the value of zero otherwise, to the first model. 
The specification then becomes: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ ) + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ )
+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(3) 
where D is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Tobin′s Q > 1, and 0 otherwise. This allows us 
to measure the impact of financial leverage on investment contingent on the growth 
opportunities available to the firms, and test hypothesis H1c. 
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The study of Serrasqueiro et al. (2007), and more recent studies like those of Jiming 
et al. (2010), Haque (2014) and Sajid et al. (2016), do not consider, or even mention, the 
potential problem of heteroskedasticity. To make our results comparable to those of 
Serrasqueiro et al. (2007), we too estimate our models with classical (non-robust) standard 
errors, but since the variance of the error terms may differ across firms, and in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity standard errors may be biased, we also run separate regressions using 
White’s correction for heteroskedasticity to get consistent standard errors, and go further than 
Lang et al. (1996) and Aivazian et al. (2005a) by using it not just for the pooled OLS but also 
for the random and fixed effects models. After correcting the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity, the coefficient estimates remain the same, but the significance of the 
variables may change. In the first two regression equations, the levels of significance of our 
key variables remain the same with and without robust standard errors, so we only report the 
latter results for reasons of space, but for the last regression equation we present the results 
of both estimations in Table 6. 
4.1.1 Robust Hausman test using the STATA command "xtoverid" 
Under the assumption of homoscedasticity, we use the Hausman specification test 
described in the previous section to determine whether the fixed effects model is preferable 
to the random effects model, and, in line with Aivazian et al. (2005a), conclude that the fixed 
effects model is the most appropriate to estimate the investment equations. To allow for the 
possibility of heteroskedasticity, Aivazian et al. (2005a) use the Huber/White/Sandwich 
estimators of standard errors, but only “for the pooling regression”. In this study, we estimate 
not just the pooling regressions but also the random and fixed effects models with robust 
(Huber/White/Sandwich) standard errors, presented in Panel B of Table 6 for equation (3). 
This, however, violates the assumptions of the Hausman test, which is invalid in the presence 
of heteroscedasticity. 
To overcome this problem, we conduct a Hausman-like test of fixed versus random 
effects based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach (using an artificial 
regression) proposed by Arellano (1993), obtained by the STATA command “xtoverid” 
provided by Schaffer and Stillman (2010), a generalization of the traditional Hausman test 
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which “unlike the Hausman version, […] extends straightforwardly to heteroskedastic- and 
cluster-robust versions” (Schaffer and Stillman, 2010). The results of this test allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis that random effects are consistent, at the 1% significance level, and 
again conclude that the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects 
model. 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the data employed in our analysis. The ratio 
of net investment to lagged net fixed assets has a mean of -0.008, close to zero as in 
Serrasqueiro et al. (2007), and a standard deviation of 0.089. The mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.028, 
and though lower than Serrasqueiro et al. (2007)’s 1.448 for their sample period prior to the 
2008 financial crisis, it can still be interpreted as indicating market expectations of high 
growth opportunities for Portuguese firms over our sample period. The mean of the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets is 0.696, while the mean of the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets is 0.253, which suggests that Portuguese firms rely significantly more on short-term 
debt financing. Return on assets (ROA) exhibits high volatility, with a mean of 2.999 and a 
standard deviation nearly four times the mean. 
The correlations between the independent variables are reported in Table 3. The two 
measures of leverage used in this study are, as expected, significantly correlated. Leverage 
as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets is positively correlated with growth 
opportunities as measured by Tobin’s Q and with profitability, but negatively correlated with 
sales. The correlations between the independent variables, and the correlation between 
investment and leverage (-0.10), are generally low, which suggests that endogeneity among 
the explanatory variables may not be relevant in this study (Serrasqueiro et al., 2007) and 
that multicollinearity is not a serious problem (Aivazian et al., 2005a). Cash flow and 
profitability have the highest correlation (0.63), but it is still lower than that of most previous 
studies, and since multicollinearity is a problem of degree, not of kind (Odit and Chittoo, 
2008), its impact is not severe enough to affect the estimates.   
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 Mean 25th 
percentile 
Median 75th 
percentile 
Standard 
deviation 
Net Investment𝑡  
Net fixed assetst−1
 
-0.008158 -0.046538 -0.001302 0.032612 0.088799 
Cash Flowt
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
0.163389 0.026676 0.115924 0.246505 0.360715 
Tobin′s Q𝑡−1 1.028086 0.810013 0.958758 1.156766 0.384478 
(
Total liabilities
Total assets
)𝑡−1 
0.695946 0.532235 0.704333 0.812284 0.251884 
(
Long term debt
Total assets
)𝑡−1 
0.253190 0.113841 0.246858 0.361848 0.164535 
(
Net Sales
Net Fixed Assets
)𝑡−1 
3.209591 0.918755 1.616655 3.896289 4.369955 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 2.999147 0.990000 3.250000 5.300000 11.92013 
Size𝑡−1 13.21231 12.12000 13.24934 14.77184 1.883266 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables defined in Table 1. The sample covers the period 
2010–2015 with an unbalanced panel of 211 observations of 44 firms. 
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Table 3: Correlation between independent variables 
 Cash Flowt
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
Tobin’s Q𝑡−1 Total liabilitiest−1
Total assetst−1
 
Long term debtt−1
Total assetst−1
 
Net Salest−1
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 Size𝑡−1 
Cash flowt
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
          1.00       
Tobin′s Q𝑡−1           0.20***         1.00      
Total liabilitiest−1
Total assetst−1
 
          0.10         0.42*** 1.00     
Long term debtt−1
Total assetst−1
 
          -0.16**         0.08 0.39*** 1.00    
Net Salest−1
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
          0.37***         -0.03 -0.12* -0.31*** 1.00   
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡           0.63***         0.26*** 0.28*** -0.05 0.03    1.00  
Size𝑡−1           -0.08         0.09 -0.03 0.32*** -0.21***    -0.05 1.00 
This table presents the correlations among the independent variables. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 
1% level.  
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5. Results 
 
The results of the reduced-form investment equation (1) are reported in Table 4. We 
find that financial leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, has a 
negative impact on net investment, at the 1% significance level. Consistent with hypotheses 
H1a and H1b, we conclude that there is a significant negative relationship between financial 
leverage and investment for Portuguese listed firms during the sample period 2010–2015. 
Rows 6 and 7 of Table 4 present the chi-square and p-values of the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests, respectively. The null hypothesis of the LM test is 
rejected at the 1% significance level, indicating that the random effects model is preferable 
to pooled OLS in estimating the investment equation. We also reject the null hypothesis of 
the Hausman test at the 1% significance level, and thus conclude that the fixed effects model 
is the most appropriate specification, and that the pooled and random effects models 
underestimate the impact of financial leverage on investment. The same holds true for 
equations (2) and (3). The F-statistics for all models are significant at the 0.0001 level, with 
adjusted R2 values ranging from 0.431 to 0.479 for the fixed effects regression models. 
A one unit increase in leverage, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, 
decreases net investment by 0.215 (Row 2 of Table 4). This negative relationship between 
leverage and investment lends support both to the theory that higher leverage likely leads to 
the agency problem of underinvestment due to debt overhang and to the overinvestment 
hypothesis that leverage has a “disciplinary role” on managers by committing them to pay 
out funds, which they could otherwise invest, to service debt. 
The ratio of long-term debt to total assets, our second measure of leverage (used by 
Aivazian et al., 2005a, but not by Serrasqueiro et al., 2007), has a positive but statistically 
insignificant impact on net investment in all specifications, so we ignore it in the subsequent 
equations. In our univariate analysis (section 4.2), we suggested that Portuguese firms, in 
order to maintain financial flexibility, rely significantly more on short-term debt than on 
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long-term debt to finance their investments. The positive but insignificant coefficient of long-
term debt indicates that overinvestment may be present but is not severe. 
The impact of cash flow on investment is statistically significant at the 1% level and 
has the expected positive sign, consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis and with the 
existence of financing constraints possibly arising from information asymmetries. The 
positive and significant coefficient of cash flow (0.142) supports H2. Like debt financing, 
the availability of internally generated funds is thus an important determinant of investment, 
which highlights the relevance of internal factors for the firm’s investment decisions. 
Growth opportunities, as measured by Tobin’s Q, have a positive but statistically 
insignificant impact on net investment in equation (1). In equation (2), where profitability 
and firm size are included as control variables, yielding the highest adjusted R2 value, growth 
opportunities are significant at the 10% level (Table 5, Row 3) in the fixed effects 
specification. Finally, in equation (3), which is directly comparable to that of Serrasqueiro et 
al. (2007), we find that growth opportunities have a positive and statistically significant effect 
on net investment in the pooled, random effects and fixed effects models at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. These results provide partial support for H3. 
The relationship between sales and investment is statistically significant in all models, 
but has a negative sign, which is inconsistent with H4. While it is surprising that as the 
demand for a firm’s goods and services increases its net investment decreases, i.e. that sales 
is a restrictive determinant of investment over the sample period, the sales coefficient is small 
(-0.006) and close to zero. The same applies for the profitability variable in equation (2), 
which has a small but negative effect on investment, significant at the 1% level, contradicting 
H5. This negative relationship between return on assets and investment does not necessarily 
mean that profits are not being reinvested: higher investment, by increasing total assets, can 
increase the denominator of the return on assets ratio and decrease its numerator through 
depreciation. 
Firm size has a positive and statistically significant effect on investment at the 1% 
level, in line with H6. Access to external finance, which influences investment decisions,
24 
 
Table 4: Regression results of equation (1): baseline specification 
 Panel A: Leverage = (Total liabilities/Total assets)𝑡−1  Panel B: Leverage = (Long term debt/Total assets)𝑡−1 
Pooling Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
FE with 
AR (1) 
Pooling Random 
effects 
Fixed  
effects 
FE with 
AR (1) 
Intercept 0.036 
(1.60) 
0.043* 
(1.79) 
0.088* 
(1.96) 
0.193*** 
(3.55) 
 0.011 
(0.49) 
0.009 
(0.38) 
0.007 
(0.15) 
0.095* 
(1.77) 
Leverage -0.078*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.086*** 
(-3.16) 
-0.215*** 
(-3.55) 
-0.241*** 
(-3.88) 
 -0.029 
(-0.76) 
-0.006 
(-0.15) 
0.017 
(0.29) 
0.014 
(0.22) 
Tobin′s Q𝑡−1 0.025 
(1.50) 
0.020 
(1.12) 
0.050 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(0.07) 
 0.005 
(0.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.018 
(-0.49) 
-0.071 
(-1.59) 
Cash Flowt
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
0.073*** 
(4.17) 
0.098*** 
(6.03) 
0.142*** 
(6.71) 
0.189*** 
(8.04) 
 0.069*** 
(3.87) 
0.093*** 
(5.52) 
0.115*** 
(5.59) 
0.154*** 
(6.67) 
Net Salest−1
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
-0.009*** 
(-6.16) 
-0.008*** 
(-5.43) 
-0.006** 
(-1.97) 
-0.020*** 
(-5.04) 
 -0.008*** 
(-5.66) 
-0.008*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.004 
(-1.28) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.11) 
LM test Chi2 (1) = 
20.18*** 
    Chi2 (1) = 
22.73*** 
   
Hausman test Chi2 (8) = 
91.99*** 
    Chi2 (8) = 
46.97*** 
   
Observations 211 211 211   211 211 211  
Adj. R2 0.166 0.152 0.431   0.127 0.116 0.386  
This table provides the regression results of investment equation (1) for Portuguese publicly traded firms from 2010–2015 using alternative models (pooled 
OLS, random effects model, and fixed effects model) and two measures of leverage. The Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test is used to test the random effects 
model versus the pooling regression. The Hausman test is used to test the fixed effects model versus the random effects model. * Significant at the 10% 
level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 5: Regression results of equation (2): alternative specification 
 Leverage = (Total liabilities/Total assets)𝑡−1 
Pooling Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
FE with 
AR (1) 
Intercept -0.066 
(1.42) 
-0.069 
(-1.31) 
-0.685** 
(-2.29) 
-0.797*** 
(-2.69) 
Leverage -0.065** 
(-2.60) 
-0.064** 
(-2.28) 
-0.144** 
(-2.02) 
-0.154** 
(-2.20) 
Tobin′s Q𝑡−1 0.021 
(1.26) 
0.018 
(0.97) 
0.073* 
(1.81) 
0.024 
(0.59) 
Cash Flowt
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
0.092*** 
(4.06) 
0.130*** 
(6.17) 
0.199*** 
(6.99) 
0.278*** 
(9.11) 
Net Salest−1
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
-0.008*** 
(-5.76) 
-0.009*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.027*** 
(-6.43) 
𝑅𝑂𝐴t -0.001 
(-1.26) 
-0.001** 
(-2.23) 
-0.002*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.003*** 
(-4.18) 
Sizet−1 0.007** 
(2.40) 
0.008** 
(2.14) 
0.054** 
(2.40) 
0.071*** 
(3.10) 
Hausman test Chi2 (10) = 
51.52*** 
   
Observations 209 209 209  
Adj. R2 0.189 0.178 0.479  
This table provides the regression results of investment equation (2) for Portuguese publicly traded firms from 
2010–2015 using alternative models (pooled OLS, random effects model, and fixed effects model). * 
Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
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may vary with firm size, as larger firms tend to have lower information asymmetries. 
Normalizing the variables (dividing them by net fixed assets) was not sufficient to eliminate 
this size effect. 
We have seen that financial leverage has a negative and significant impact on net 
investment, which supports the view that capital structure plays an important role in 
determining investment decisions. 
In order to differentiate the impact of financial leverage on investment in firms with 
high growth opportunities from that in firms with low growth opportunities, we added an 
interaction term between leverage and the dummy variable defined in Section 4.1 to equation 
(1). The results of these regressions with classical standard errors (used in most previous 
studies, including that of Serrasqueiro et al., 2007, which do not take heteroskedasticity into 
account) and with robust standard errors (used by Aivazian et al., 2005a, for the pooled 
regression, and by us for the pooled, random and fixed effects models) are shown in Panel A 
and Panel B, respectively, of Table 6.  
We find that the coefficient of the interaction term (D×Leverage) is statistically 
significant in the pooled OLS and in the random effects models at the 5% level, but not in 
the fixed effects model without robust standard errors. Serrasqueiro et al. (2007), in their 
study of the investment determinants of Portuguese listed companies, found this interaction 
term between the dummy variable and leverage to be statistically insignificant across all 
specifications. In contrast, after correcting for heteroskedasticity, we find that the coefficient 
of the interaction term is statistically significant in the pooled OLS and random effects 
models with robust standard errors at the 1% level, and in the fixed effects model with robust 
standard errors at the 5% level. 
We reject the null hypothesis of the robust Hausman test, presented in Row 9 of Table 
6, at the 1% significance level, which indicates once again that the fixed effects model is the 
most appropriate specification. The results of the fixed effects regression with robust standard 
errors do not change the estimated coefficients from the regression without robust standard 
errors, and the statistical significance of the variables leverage, cash flows and sales remains 
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unchanged, so our main conclusions are not altered. However, the interaction term between 
the dummy variable and leverage becomes statistically significant at the 5% level (p-value 
of 0.036), and the growth opportunities variable loses its previous statistical significance at 
the 10% level (p-value of 0.109). The coefficient of the interaction term was expected to have 
a positive sign, but we find that it is negative in all specifications, which contradicts 
hypothesis H1c that the documented negative relationship between financial leverage and 
investment is stronger for firms with low growth opportunities. 
The finding that the negative relationship between leverage and investment is stronger 
for firms with high growth opportunities, while not in line with most empirical studies, is not 
unprecedented (e.g., Serrasqueiro et al., 2007, in their study of Portuguese firms, report a 
negative, though statistically insignificant, coefficient for the interaction term in three 
different model specifications, and Chen et al., 2013, in their study of Chinese firms, found 
that the negative effect of financial leverage on investment is significantly stronger for high-
growth firms), but further research is needed. Our results suggest that financial leverage may 
aggravate the underinvestment problem for firms with high growth opportunities. 
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Table 6: Regression results of equation (3): differences in the role of leverage for high versus low growth firms 
 Panel A: Leverage = (Total liabilities/Total assets)𝑡−1 
Non-robust standard errors 
 Panel B: Leverage = (Total liabilities/Total assets)𝑡−1 
Robust standard errors 
Pooling Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
 Pooling Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Intercept -0.002 
(-0.06) 
0.008 
(0.27) 
0.062 
(1.30) 
 -0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.008 
(0.22) 
0.062 
(1.36) 
Leverage -0.043 
(-1.53) 
-0.054* 
(-1.78) 
-0.193*** 
(-3.11) 
 -0.043 
(-1.49) 
-0.054 
(-1.30) 
-0.193*** 
(-2.93) 
Tobin′s Q𝑡−1 0.053*** 
(2.63) 
0.047** 
(2.20) 
0.073* 
(1.68) 
 0.053*** 
(2.70) 
0.047* 
(1.70) 
0.073 
(1.64) 
Cash Flowt
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
0.071*** 
(4.13) 
0.096*** 
(5.94) 
0.142*** 
(6.72) 
 0.071 
(1.22) 
0.096* 
(1.82) 
0.142*** 
(3.03) 
Net Salest−1
Net Fixed Assetst−1
 
-0.009*** 
(-6.16) 
-0.008*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.006** 
(-2.03) 
 -0.009** 
(-2.57) 
-0.008*** 
(-5.29) 
-0.006** 
(-1.90) 
D×Leverage -0.049** 
(-2.40) 
-0.046** 
(-2.30) 
-0.038 
(-1.49) 
 -0.049*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.046*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.038** 
(-2.17) 
LM test Chi2 (1) = 18.15***       
Hausman test Chi2 (9) = 83.29***       
Robust Hausman test     Chi2 (8) = 63.871***   
Observations 211 211 211  211 211 211 
Adj. R2 0.185 0.166 0.436  0.185 0.166 0.436 
This table provides the regression results of investment equation (3) for Portuguese publicly traded firms from 2010–2015 using alternative models (pooled 
OLS, random effects model, and fixed effects model). The t-statistics of the regressions in Panel B are based on heteroskedastic-consistent (White-robust) 
standard errors. The robust Hausman test, obtained by the STATA command “xtoverid”, is used to test the fixed effects model versus the random effects 
model for the regressions with robust standard errors. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This thesis examined the relationship between financial leverage and investment for 
Portuguese listed companies between 2010 and 2015. We found that financial leverage, 
measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, has a negative and significant impact 
on investment across all specifications, which supports our main hypothesis that there is a 
negative and significant relationship between financial leverage and investment as predicted 
by agency theory, confirming that capital structure plays a significant role in determining 
investment decisions. 
Our results indicate that the pooled and random effects models underestimate the 
impact of financial leverage on investment, and that the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate specification. We extended the analysis of the investment decisions of 
Portuguese listed companies by Serrasqueiro et al. (2007) to a more recent time period, 
included two additional control variables, tested another measure of leverage, and further 
addressed the problem of heteroskedasticity by using robust standard errors not just for the 
pooled OLS but also for the random and fixed effects models. While they found the 
interaction term between leverage and a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms 
with high growth opportunities and zero otherwise to be statistically insignificant in all 
models, we found it to be significant in the pooled and random effects models without robust 
standard errors, as well as in the pooled, random and fixed effects models with robust 
standard errors. 
The coefficient of the interaction term (D×Leverage) was negative, which implies 
that the negative effect of leverage on investment is stronger for firms with high growth 
opportunities, and contradicts the hypothesis that leverage plays a disciplining role for firms 
with low growth opportunities. We conclude that debt financing in firms with low growth 
opportunities was not sufficient to alleviate the agency problem of overinvestment resulting 
from a shortage of positive NPV projects and managerial self-interest, and that financial 
leverage constrains investment and exacerbates the underinvestment problem due to debt 
overhang for firms with high growth opportunities. Further research is needed to confirm 
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these findings, but based on the results of this study it is recommended that firms with high 
growth opportunities consider lowering their leverage ratios in order to mitigate the debt 
overhang problem (Myers, 1977), retain financial flexibility, and be able to exploit those 
valuable growth opportunities. 
There are several potential limitations to this study. First, we assumed that investment 
decisions depend only on current and one-year lagged independent variables. Second, other 
measures (such as the price-to-earnings ratio, instead of Tobin’s Q) could be used to both 
measure firms' growth opportunities and distinguish between high- and low-growth firms. 
Third, given the limited sample size, our results should be interpreted with caution. Future 
studies may consider other factors, including macroeconomic conditions such as interest 
rates, monetary policy and uncertainty, and explore different methodologies such as a 
dynamic simultaneous equation model, in order to further assess the relationship between 
financial leverage and investment decisions. 
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